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The Influence of Perspective and 
Communicative Goals on How 
Speakers Choose to Refer
DANIEL J. GRODNER AND RACHEL M. ADLER
15.1. Introduction
Speakers make frequent choices about the form and content of their referential 
descriptions. For instance, a particular apple might be labelled concisely with a 
simple pronoun such as it, or with a more longwinded form such as the golden 
delicious apple that my Uncle Frank bought at the Tanenhaus grocery. These choices 
are shaped by both communicative and cognitive forces.
Communicative pressures arise because speakers must design utterances so their 
intentions are intelligible to their audience. Accordingly, referential descriptions are 
typically constructed so that addressees can efficiently map them to intended refer­
ents with minimal ambiguity. To accomplish this, co-operative speakers adhere to 
the Gricean maxims (1975). The maxim of Quantity, which enjoins the speaker to 
provide an appropriate level of information for the addressee, is particularly relevant 
for determining how concise a description will be. On the one hand, speakers must 
provide enough information. If there are multiple entities of one type, and the 
speaker wants to refer to a subset of them, then she must include sufficient infor­
mation to distinguish them. In a situation with two mutually salient vases, asking for 
the vase would lead to communicative failure. On the other hand, too much infor­
mation can also pose an impediment to understanding. Superfluous information is 
potentially inefficient, but more importantly, it can be misleading. Suppose a speaker 
asks an addressee to fetch the large vase. This typically implicates that there are 
multiple vases that differ in size.^ This is because an unmodified label (the vase)
‘ Analogously, a politician referring to himself as a compassionate conservative conveys that some 
conservatives are not compassionate.
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would have been sufficient to identify^ a lone vase. A co-operative speaker should only 
produce the modified form if the additional information serves some purpose. 
A common function for a modifier is to distinguish a referent from entities of the 
same type. Hence the addressee infers the existence of contrasting entities (a small 
vase) (Crain and Steedman 1985; Grodner and Sedivy 2011; Sedivy et al. 1999). If there 
is only a single vase, this contrastive inference could result in a fruitless search for a 
larger one. Consistent with this, over-informative descriptions are rated as less 
felicitous by perceivers (Davies and Katsos 2009) and evoke neural responses associ­
ated with processing difficulty (Englehardt et al. 2011).
Cognitive influences also play a role in shaping referential descriptions. The 
processes involved in planning and producing utterances impose demands on limited 
attention and memory resources (Arnold 2008; Ferreira 2010). As a consequence, 
descriptions are more likely to incorporate easily accessed words and syntax. This can 
put cognitive pressures in conflict with communicative needs because the most 
readily available forms for the speaker are not always ideal for conveying a desired 
message to the addressee. For instance, words and syntactic constructions that have 
recently been encountered are frequently re-used even when this leads to prolix 
forms (e.g., the square that is red rather than the red square; Cleland and Pickering 
2003) or more information than necessary to identify a referent (Brennan and Clark 
1996). Additionally, features that are perceptually or situationally salient are often 
explicitly labelled by incorporating modifiers in descriptions of objects without a 
contextual contrast (Belke and Meyer 2002; Carbary and Tanenhaus 2008; Davies 
and Katsos 2009; Sedivy 2003; Wardlow Lane and Ferreira 2008). In these cases, the 
extra information does not serve a distinguishing function and seems to be driven by 
factors internal to the speaker. To illustrate, colour properties are often encoded 
when describing objects in isolation (Pechman 1989; Sedivy 2003). How frequently 
this occurs is a function of both perceptual availability and linguistic codability (Belke 
and Meyer 2002; Viethen et al. 2012).
Understanding the interplay between external communicative pressures and 
internal cognitive pressures is key to predicting the brevity of a speaker’s description. 
The present study investigates this issue by exploring how the goals of the communi­
cative act affect the speaker’s ability to take the addressee’s perspective.
Participants were asked to play a language game where it was either in the speaker’s 
interest to co-operate with the addressee or to compete with the addressee. Manipu­
lating communicative goals in this way affected both communicative and cognitive 
pressures. Communicative pressures were shifted because the Gricean maxims only 
apply to co-operative speakers. In the competitive situation, it was in the speaker’s 
communicative interest to withhold valuable information from the addressee. At the 
same time, competition may have made valuable information more salient. Thus 
cognitive pressures may have favoured leaking this information to the addressee 
(Wardlow Lane et al. 2006).
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The results below indicate that referential descriptions are extremely sensitive to 
the addressee’s communicative needs but are also systematically constrained by the 
cognitive limits of the speaker.
15.1.1. Taking the perspective of one’s audience
Because different addressees have different needs, an optimally informative speaker 
should tailor her descriptions to her particular audience. This requires that speakers 
distinguish their own privileged knowledge from the mutual knowledge, or common 
ground, shared by the interlocutors (Clark 1996; Clark and Marshall 1981; Clark and 
Murphy 1983). To illustrate, consider a situation where the speaker wants to refer to 
one of two size-contrasting objects that are visible to her (e.g., a large vase in the 
presence of a smaller one), but only the intended referent is visible to the addressee 
(and the interlocutors are mutually aware of the addressee’s viewpoint). From the 
speaker’s egocentric knowledge perspective, a modified description is necessary 
because she can see two referents. This would be over-informative from the address­
ee’s perspective.
Speakers do accommodate aspects of the addressee’s knowledge at least some of 
the time. For instance, they hyper-articulate and simplify descriptions for addressees 
who might have comprehension difficulty such as non-native speakers (Bradlow 
2002) and individuals with cognitive impairments (DePaulo and Coleman 1986). 
They also use names for referents in domains in which the addressee has expertise, 
but full descriptions when the addressee is a novice (Isaacs and Clark 1987). Despite 
such examples, the extent to which speakers adapt to the perspective of their 
particular audience and the mechanisms underlying the process are controversial.
15.1.2. Models of perspective taking
Theories vary with respect to when and how effectively perspective information is 
computed and integrated in real-time conversation. One view is that the early stages 
of production are egocentric and referring expressions are initially constructed using 
the speaker’s perspective (Horton and Keysar 1996; Keysar and Barr 2002). The 
addressee’s perspective can be strategically incorporated at a second stage, when 
the speaker monitors the output of the initial stage for potential misunderstanding 
and adjusts the expression if confusion is indicated. The theoretical motivation for 
this ordering is that while the speaker presumably has direct access to her own 
knowledge, shared information depends on diverse sources of contextual informa­
tion. These include linguistic mention, physical co-presence, or other general infor­
mation that indicates the addressee is a member of a community with characteristic 
knowledge (Clark and Marshall 1981). Coordinating these different types of infor­
mation may be computationally burdensome, hence effortful and prone to failure. 
Proponents of this view claim that egocentricity is generally unproblematic because
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referents salient to the speaker tend to be also salient to the addressee. Even in cases 
where this isn’t true, egocentric errors might be readily diagnosed and corrected by 
feedback from the addressee (Keysar et al. 2000; see also Clark and Krych 2004).
A contrasting view holds that perspective information immediately constrains 
reference production and that the influence of shared perspective is weighted 
according to how reliable it is in a given context and how relevant it is to the 
speaker’s communicative goals (Brennan and Hanna 2009; Hanna et al. 2003; Heller 
etal. 2008; Yoon etal. 2012). Proponents of this view note that all interpersonal 
communication can be characterized as converting privileged information into 
shared information. In fact, there is no reason to communicate if the information 
being conveyed is already in common ground. Hence the distinction between shared 
and privileged knowledge is fundamental to the formulation of any utterance, and 
egocentricity would cause a significant disruption to communication. On this view, 
identifying shared information need not be difficult because speakers would be highly 
practised at using it, and it involves the kind of social pragmatic reasoning at which 
humans excel (Tomasello 2008). For instance, even young infants can identify 
the attentional states and intentions of other humans that are distinct from their 
own (e.g., Csibra 2010; Liszkowski et al. 2008).
15.1.3. How sensitive are speakers to the needs of their audience?
Existing evidence for partner-specific accommodation yields a mixed picture. On the 
one hand, studies consistently show that referential descriptions respect shared 
information the majority of the time. Speakers are highly sensitive to the recent 
linguistic context. Brennan and Clark (1996; see also Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs 1986) 
had pairs of participants play several rounds of a communication game where they 
were required to put stacks of pictures in a particular order. They found that speakers 
would faithfully re-use recently established labels with a familiar partner even when 
this led to modified descriptions for objects that had no contextual contrast. In 
contrast, they used basic level descriptions with new partners. Heller et al. (2012) 
found that speakers reliably used names rather than descriptions to identify novel 
objects that they learned alongside the addressee, but provided descriptions for 
referents whose names they learned in isolation.^ Galati and Brennan (2010) had 
speakers narrate a Road Runner cartoon story multiple times. Descriptions were 
shortened and simplified when speakers retold the story to the same addressee, but 
not when they retold the story to a new addressee.
Speakers also typically take the addressee’s visual perspective into account when 
planning descriptions. For instance, Lockridge and Brennan (2002) had speakers 
describe actions depicted in pictures to addressees who could either see the pictures
^ Though speakers sometimes redundantly included names for purposes unrelated to identification.
268 Grodner and Adler
or not. Speakers only included information that the addressee could not infer on their 
own. Specifically, speakers were more likely to include indefinite references to 
unpredictable instruments (e.g., an ice-pick for a stabbing) when the addressee 
could not see the event, but used definite references, or omitted a reference entirely, 
when the addressee could see the event or if the instrument was predictable from the 
action. Another example comes from Nadig and Sedivy (2002). They compared 
adults and four- to five-year-old children, who are thought to be more egocentric 
than adults, in their ability to weight the visual perspective of an addressee. Partici­
pants asked an addressee to pick up one of several mutually visible objects in the 
presence of an additional object that was privileged to the speaker. Both children and 
adults were more likely to produce descriptions with size adjectives when there was a 
mutually visible size contrast in addition to the target referent (e.g., a large vase target 
in the presence of a smaller vase contrast) than when a size contrast was only visible 
to the speaker.
On the other hand, evidence indicates that the speaker’s egocentric perspective 
often intrudes on their descriptions. Arnold and Griffin (2007) had speakers com­
plete a story told in a series of two pictures. The second picture required reference to 
a character that had already been named previously (e.g., Mickey) in one of two 
conditions; when that character was alone, or in the presence of a second, differently 
gendered character. Speakers were more than twice as likely to repeat the name of the 
character instead of using a more concise pronoun even though either expression 
would have yielded an unambiguous reference. Similar results have been obtained for 
full definite noun phrases {the cowboy) versus pronouns (Fukumura et al. 2011). This 
effect suggests that the choice of a referring expression is sometimes driven by 
how many referents currently occupy the speaker’s attention, independent of the 
audience’s needs. Another example comes from Horton and Keysar (1996). They 
instructed participants to describe a moving target object on a screen before them 
so that an addressee could decide whether an identical object was moving on a 
separate screen. They manipulated whether there was a contrast for the target in the 
speaker’s display and whether or not this was shared or privileged knowledge. Like 
Nadig and Sedivy, they found that speakers used modification more frequently when 
there was a shared contextual contrast than when a contextual contrast was privil­
eged. However, when speakers were forced to give speeded judgments under time 
pressure, this difference disappeared. This supports the view that speakers might 
initially formulate descriptions from their egocentric perspective. The time pressure 
may have prevented them from entering the second stage of processing where they 
could make addressee-specific adjustments. Wardlow Lane and Ferreira (2008) also 
report evidence that cognitive pressures can cause descriptions to be increasingly 
egocentric. They manipulated the salience of a privileged contrast to the speaker. In 
one experiment, the privileged object was the target referent on some filler trials 
(2008:1469, experiment 1). This made it more difficult for the speaker to ignore the
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privUeged objects. When privileged objects were made salient to the speaker in this 
way, participants were more likely to modify descriptions of targets that had privil­
eged contrasts. This was true even though on rare occasions (roughly 9 per cent of 
trials) it caused addressees to mistakenly assume the speaker was referring to the 
privileged item.
15.1.4. The influence of communicative goals on perspective use
One frequently overlooked factor in this literature is the nature and urgency of the 
speaker s communicative goals. This is potentially critical to how perspective infor­
mation will be used. Different illocutionary goals, for instance, place emphasis on 
either privileged or shared information: Assertions place content from the speaker’s 
privileged knowledge in focus, requests must refer to shared information, and 
questions inquire about the addressee s privileged knowledge. In comprehension, 
individuals rapidly attend to the information appropriate to the speech act (Brown- 
Schmidt etal. 2008). Yoon etal. (2012) observed that the tasks in studies where 
perspective use seems most limited tend to involve different speech acts than those 
that find perspective sensitivity. For instance, Horton and Keysar (1996) had partici­
pants describe a referent so that the addressee could verify whether or not he saw the 
same object, and Arnold and Griffin (2007) had participants narrate a scene for a 
potential addressee. Both tasks involve assertions and thereby emphasize the 
speakers privileged knowledge. Wardlow Lane and Ferreira (2008) asked speakers 
to provide descriptions so an addressee could identify the target object. This is 
potentially different from having speakers formulate requests that the addressee act 
on a physical referent (e.g.. Pick up the tall vase, Move the large block to the left) 
(Nadig and Sedivy 2002). Attempting to effect more complex actions may heighten 
sensitivity to the needs of the addressee. To examine this hypothesis, Yoon et al. 
(2012) directly manipulated whether the speaker described or requested an antici­
pated action. They found that speakers were indeed less likely to include modifiers 
for targets with privileged contrasts when requesting than when describing.
The clarity and importance of the speaker’s goals are also potentially important to 
perspective sensitivity. Speakers should be more sensitive to the addressee’s needs 
when there are clear and meaningful reasons for doing so. For example, in the studies 
reviewed above, instances of over-informing are somewhat common, whereas under­
informing is rare. Indeed, eye-tracking evidence suggests that under-informing 
occurs primarily when the speaker has not noticed the contextual contrast prior to 
uttering the referring expression (Brown-Schmidt and Tanenhaus 2006). In these 
cases, the presence of a contrast is not part of the speaker’s privileged knowledge, and 
thus under-informing is not a consequence of egocentricity. The relative rarity of 
under-informing is likely because the communicative costs are much higher than for 
over-informing. Under-informing can easily cause the addressee to select the wrong
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referent. Though it can result in comprehension difficulty, over-informing rarely 
causes referential failure, and might even be helpful in some circumstances (Davies 
and Katsos 2009). For this reason, it may be inappropriate to interpret rates of over­
informing as diagnostic of perspective taking abilities.
One solution is to strengthen the incentives related to over-informing. Wardlow 
Lane etal. (2006) adopted this strategy by making a referential task competitive 
rather than co-operative. Speakers described a mutually visible target object for an 
addressee to pick out of an array. The speaker had access to a privileged object that 
was either a size contrast for the target, or a completely unrelated object. To 
manipulate communicative goals, the speaker was either specifically instructed not 
to provide the addressee with information about the privileged ground object 
(competitive condition) or was not (control condition). For the competitive condi­
tion, if the addressee identified the correct target, he was given the option to guess the 
identity of the privileged object. If he got it right, then he received a point. If he got it 
wrong, a point was subtracted. Speakers were told to limit the addressee’s point total. 
As outlined above, the use of a modifier implicates that the privileged object is a size 
contrast for the target. By this reasoning, it would have been in the speaker’s interest 
to withhold the modifier when the privileged item was a contrasting object. In the 
control condition, speakers used size modifiers 5.4 per cent of the time. When 
specifically told to conceal the identity of the privileged object speakers included a 
size modifier significantly more often: 14.4 per cent of the time. The authors argue 
that the directive to conceal the privileged object’s identity made this information 
more salient, and hence made it harder for speakers to suppress their egocentric 
perspective (Wardlow Lane et al. 2006).
There are some potential concerns with this conclusion. First, the point system was 
abstract and there were no clear consequences for winning or losing. Additionally, 
each speaker shifted between the competitive and control conditions. Hence it is 
possible that incentives to conceal the hidden object were confusing, or did not 
motivate speakers sufficiently. Second, the vast majority of linguistic interaction is 
collaborative and governed by expectations of co-operation (Grice 1975).^ As a result, 
people may be relatively unskilled at taking perspective in competitive communi­
cation. To this end, it is important to establish whether speakers show similar limits 
in adapting to their audience’s needs during co-operative communication.
^ Though interlocutors frequently have different social goals, they usually communicate co-operatively. 
We can only think of two counterexamples. This first is regulations (e.g., laws and rules) and contracts. 
Because the speaker in these cases cannot assume their utterances will be interpreted co-operatively, they 
must be exceptionally explicit and verbose. The second is misleading language such as deception or 
withholding. This type of situation is much more common. However, the speaker can only mislead the 
addressee by convincing them that they are acting co-operatively. In this way, misleading requires 
modelling how a co-operative speaker would behave.
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15.2. Study: How is perspective sensitivity affected by co-operative 
and competitive communicative goals?
15.2.1. Objectives, overview, and predictions
The present study examines the extent to which speakers’ descriptions are influenced 
by the knowledge of their interlocutor in interactions with clear competitive and co­
operative incentives. Participants were asked to play a communication game in which 
a speaker directed an addressee to manipulate objects in an array. Their perspectives 
were intentionally misaligned so that one of the objects was concealed from the 
addressee and only visible to the speaker. The speaker's task was to provide a single 
instruction directing the addressee to pick up a mutually visible target object 
(e.g., Move the pink sponge). If the addressee picked up the correct object, he and 
the speaker received a point. The addressee then had to guess the identity of the 
concealed object from among three choices. In the co-operative version of the game, 
the speaker and addressee got a point if he guessed the correct object. The pair had to 
surpass a combined score threshold to win a prize. In the competitive version, the 
speaker received a point when the addressee guessed incorrectly. If the addressee 
guessed correctly, he gained a point and the speaker lost a point. Only one of the 
players could win the prize.^ The nature of the other items in the display was also 
manipulated. There was either a size contrast for the target (e.g., a smaller pink 
sponge) among the mutually visible objects, a size contrast as the privileged object, or 
no size contrast for the target.
The co-operative game provides clear incentives for producing different referential 
forms. The speaker should provide a size adjective (e.g.. Pick up the small sponge) 
whenever a size contrast is present, regardless of whether it is mutually visible or 
privileged. In the mutually visible case, this is necessary to successfully refer to the 
target object. In the privileged case, the modifier is needed to implicate the identity of 
the hidden object. In contrast, when the hidden object is not a size contrast (e.g., a 
pink eraser), there is a disincentive to provide a size modifier as this may mislead the 
addressee about the hidden object. In this case, a co-operative speaker might provide 
a non-size adjective that denotes properties the concealed object shares with the 
target (e.g.. Pick up the pink sponge) to provide some information about the hidden 
object.
Wardiow Lane and Liersch (2012) looked at the effects of offering monetary incentives on perspective 
use. However, the addressee and speaker were not competing against one another. Among all participants 
in their study, the addressee with the highest score got a prize, and so did the speaker with the highest score. 
Further, in their point system, the speaker gained points when the addressee guessed correctly and the 
addressee gained points for incorrect guesses rather than not guessing. Thus the incentives for revealing 
privileged information were complex and somewhat contradictory.
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The competitive game creates a dramatically different set of incentives. Speakers 
should still provide a size modifier when a size contrast is mutually visible in order to 
identify the target. However, they should not provide a size adjective when a size 
contrast is privileged as this would implicate the identity of the concealed object. In 
fact, competitive speakers have an incentive to occasionally include a size modifier 
when no size contrast is present in order to mislead the addressee. Deception 
demands more than merely representing the addressee’s current knowledge. One 
has to simultaneously represent a belief state that is at odds with reality, and to figure 
out what information needs to be provided to manoeuver the addressee from his 
current knowledge state to the counterfactual one. It is not surprising that the ability 
to deceive is one of the more advanced milestones in theory of mind development 
(Baron-Cohen 2007). Evidence for deception would thus indicate that speakers are 
extremely good at recognizing (and frustrating) their addressee’s communicative 
goals.
The outcome of the present study depends on how the balance of cognitive and 
communicative pressures shifts under different incentive structures. One possibility 
is that speakers are better able to determine the addressee’s communicative needs 
when given sufficiently strong communicative incentives. For the competitive condi­
tion, this would mean that speakers rarely or never include a modifier when naming 
the target in the presence of a privileged contrast. For the co-operative condition, the 
speaker should be just as likely to provide a modifier when there is a privileged 
contrast as when there is a shared contrast.
A second possibility is that enhanced competitive and co-operative incentives will 
heighten the salience of the privileged object. This would increase cognitive pressure 
for target descriptions to include reference to it (Wardlow Lane et al. 2006). This 
predicts disparate effects in competitive and co-operative situations. In competitive 
situations, this would work against communicative incentives and cause an increase 
in size modification for the privileged contrast condition. In co-operative situations, 
this pressure would be aligned with communicative incentives to include a size 
modifier in the privileged contrast condition. This should cause the rate of modified 
forms in the privileged contrast condition to be similar to, or greater than, the rate for 
the shared contrast condition.
A third possibility is that, because communication is typically co-operative, it is 
easier to adjust to a partner’s communicative goals in a co-operative situation 
compared to a competitive one. This predicts that speakers will find it hard to 
avoid size modifiers with a privileged contrast present in the competitive game. In 
contrast, this hypothesis predicts that it should be relatively easy to include size 
modifiers with a privileged contrast present in the co-operative game.
A final possibility makes the opposite predictions. Namely competition might 
actually increase sensitivity to the addressee’s communicative needs compared to 
co-operation. In co-operative communication, a speaker can count on corrective
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feedback from the addressee if her utterance fails to meet his needs (Clark and Krych 
2004). Thus, she need not be as careful in tailoring her descriptions to achieve her 
goals as in competitive communication. Indirect support for this hypothesis comes 
from Savitsky et al. (2011). They found that speakers were more likely to assume an 
ambiguous utterance was correctly interpreted when delivered to a friend rather than 
a stranger. They argued that people are willing to rely on friends to provide co­
operative feedback, but may not be willing to do so with strangers. According to this 
view, when naming a target with a privileged size contrast, speakers would be more 
likely to omit size modifiers in the competitive game than to include size modifiers in 
the co-operative game.
15.2.2. Methods
15.2.2.1. Participants A total of 90 Swarthmore College undergraduates (45 pairs) 
completed the study for partial course credit; half served as speakers, half as address­
ees. All participants were native English speakers.
15.2.2.2. Materials Forty-five stimulus displays were prepared for each pair of 
participants. Displays consisted of three mutually visible objects (shared), and one 
object visible only to the speaker (privileged). One of the shared objects was desig­
nated the target. Critical display types are depicted in Figures 15.1 and 15.2. Twenty 
displays were constructed so that the target could either be unique (unique target 
condition) or have a privileged object that was identical to the target, but was a 
different size (privileged contrast condition). The unique target condition was 
created from the privileged contrast condition by replacing the size contrast with 
an object of a different type but of similar size and visual complexity. These displays 
were assigned to two counterbalanced presentation lists so that each participant pair 
saw each of these displays exactly once, and each condition ten times. Five additional
(A)
1
7^
(B)
« . _
Figure 15.1. Illustration of the critical display types from the speaker’s viewpoint in (A) the 
privileged contrast condition, (B) the unique target condition, and (C) the shared contrast 
control. The circle indicates the target item (the small cup) and the grey background indicates 
the location of the privileged item.
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Figure 15.2. Illustrations of the critical display types from the addressee’s viewpoint with (A) a 
privileged contrast, (B) a unique target, and (C) a shared contrast. The target item is the small 
cup and the grey square indicates the location of the privileged item.
critical displays were designed to assess the rate of modification for targets that had a 
size contrast among the mutually visible objects (shared contrast condition). The 
remaining 20 displays were fillers and divided among four types: (a) two pairs of size 
contrasted objects where the size contrast for the target was privileged; (b) two pairs 
of size contrasted objects where the size contrast for the target was shared; (c) the 
target was unique, but a size contrasting pair of objects was among the shared objects; 
(d) the target was unique, but the privileged object was a size contrast for one of the 
shared objects. The filler displays prevented the participants from being able to 
identify the target and privileged objects in advance, and highlighted the presence 
of size contrasts. Two of the filler displays were designated practice trials. The 
remaining 18 were pseudo-randomly mixed with the 25 critical displays in a single 
presentation order.
15.2.2.3. Procedure Each participant pair was assigned to either the co-operative 
condition (33 pairs) or the competitive condition (12 pairs). The roles of speaker and 
addressee were randomly assigned based on a coin toss. Participants sat across from 
each other at a table with 33x3 grid of square cubbies between them. The centre 
column of the cubbies was occluded so that the addressee could not see the speaker’s 
head- and eye-movements. At the beginning of each trial, the four corner cubbies 
were concealed from the addressee by black felt squares affixed with Velcro. The 
speaker was given a bag of four objects and asked to arrange the objects in the corner 
cubbies according to a photograph while the addressee closed his eyes and covered 
his ears. Once the objects were placed, the addressee was directed to unveil three of 
the four corner cubbies according to a separate diagram. At this point, the speaker 
saw four objects of which the addressee could only see three. The speaker then 
requested that the addressee pick up the target object, which was indicated by a green 
circle superimposed on her photograph. The locations of the target and hidden
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objects were pseudo-randomly determined. The addressee picked up the object and 
the experimenter recorded his selection. After the addressee selected the target, he 
had to guess the identity of the concealed object from a separate photograph 
containing three candidates. A contextual contrast was among the candidates on 50 
per cent of the trials.
For the competitive game, each participant received a separate score. The speaker 
and addressee each gained a point if the addressee picked up the correct target, and 
the speaker lost a point if the addressee picked up the wrong target. This forced 
speakers to describe the correct target rather than one of the other shared objects. If 
the addressee guessed the hidden object correctly, he gained two points. If he guessed 
incorrectly, the addressee lost a point. This allocation was designed to correct for 
random guesses. If the addressee selected at random among the three choices, the two 
participants would (on average) have ended up with equivalent scores. In order to 
win the game, participants had to both outscore their partner and receive more than 42 
points (1 point per trial). The latter condition was intended to motivate participants to 
try hard until the end of the game, even if they were far ahead of their partner. For the 
co-operative game, the participants received a single shared score. If the addressee 
picked up the correct target, the pair earned a point. If the addresses guessed the hidden 
object correctiy another point was earned. If he guessed incorrecdy, a point was 
subtracted. In order to win the game, the pair had to earn more than .86 points per 
trial. Thus the addressee had to guess correctly at a rate significandy better than chance 
(.67 points per trial). The experimenter updated the score(s) on a mutually visible 
whiteboard after each trial. Winners received a king size candy bar as a prize.
In post-experimental questionnaires, participants in both games universally indi­
cated that they were highly motivated to win, and most respondents reported that the 
candy was a potent motivator. Each participant pair completed two practice trials 
followed by 43 test trials. The speaker and addressee switched roles for one practice 
trial to better understand their partner’s role, and to ensure that both understood the 
felt veils truly obscured the hidden objects.
15.2.2.4. Data Coding The speakers’ requests were recorded using an Audio-Technica 
ATR20C microphone and video recordings of the addressees’ responses were 
collected using a SONY Handycam DCR-HC62. Data were stored on SONY MiniDV 
tapes, and imported onto an external hard drive via iMovie 8.0.4. Two research 
assistants (blind to the conditions and hypotheses) and the experimenter (blind to 
the conditions) transcribed the requests. Descriptions were coded for whether they 
contained size modifiers, non-size modifiers, and disfluencies. The latter was 
recorded because disfluent speech is a sign of cognitive production effort (Clark 
and WUkes-Gibbs 1986). Requests that contained filled pause markers (uh, um, thee), 
repairs, or repetitions were marked as disfluent. For space reasons, we do not report 
the disfluency data below.
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15.3. Results 
15.3.1. Size modifiers
We examined the use of size modifiers to pick out the target. The proportion of 
descriptions that included size and non-size modifiers across the three conditions 
and game types are provided in Table 15.1. These data were entered into a 3 x 2 
ANOVA crossing display condition with game type.® This yielded a reliable inter­
action (Fi(2,86)=42.2, P < .001), as well as main effects of display type (Fi(2,86)=2i6, 
P < .001) and game type (Fi(i,431=20.3, P < .001). Speakers were more likely to produce 
size modifiers in the co-operative game and game type had different influences across 
display types. Thus the incentive manipulation altered speaker behaviour.
In the co-operative game, the rate of size modification was reliably different for 
each display (Fs > 7, Ps < .05). Most importantly, the shared contrast elicited reliably 
more size modification than the privileged contrast (Fi(i,32)=7.4, P < .05; F2(i,23) 
=52.8, P < .001). Thus speakers did not optimally adjust their descriptions to help 
addressees guess the privileged contrast.
In the competitive game, the shared contrast condition elicited reliably more size 
modifiers than either of the other conditions (Fs > 126, Ps < .001). The unique target 
condition did not differ from the privileged condition, however (Fs < 2). To see 
whether competitive speakers over-informed in these two conditions, each was 
compared to the unique target condition for the co-operative speakers. Competitive 
speakers produced reliably more size modifiers in the unique target condition than 
co-operative speakers (Fi(i,43)=i8.7, P < .001; F2(i,i9)=ii.6, P < .01). This suggests 
that speakers over-informed in order to plant the false belief that the privileged object 
was a size contrast for the target. Competitive speakers also over-informed in the 
privileged contrast condition (Fi(i,43)=4.4, P < .05; F2(i,i9)=5.8, P < .05). This
Table 15.1. The mean percentage of target descriptions containing size and non­
size modifiers for the critical conditions in the present study. Standard errors are 
given in parentheses.
Size Modifiers Non-Size Modifiers
Co-operative Competitive Co-operative Competitive
Unique Target
Privileged Contrast 
Shared Contrast
4.6% (1.3%) 
78.8% (5.9%) 
95.4% (1.6%)
17.5% (3.3%) 
12.5% (4.5%) 
93.3% (2.8%)
63.3% (6.1%) 
40.5% (5.4%) 
51.5% (5.2%)
29.2% (7.4%) 
34-2% (7-7%) 
33-3% (4-5%)
^ Proportional data are not normally distributed, which is a prerequisite of ANOVA. To correct for this, 
participant and item means were log odds transformed (Agresti 2002). Ones and zeroes were replaced 
according to the procedure outlined by Macmillan and Creelman (2004).
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replicates the pattern observed by Wardlow Lane etal. (2006). Thus, even with 
stronger incentives, competitive speakers disclosed information about the identity 
of the privileged contrast at a rate greater than baseline.
To establish whether competition or co-operation elicited less optimal perspective 
taking behaviour, we compared the difference between the actual modification rate 
observed in the privileged contrast condition and the theoretical modification rate for 
optimal behaviour (100 per cent for co-operative speakers, 0 per cent for competitive 
speakers). There was a trend toward more optimal behaviour in the competitive 
condition. This was reliable in the items analysis (F2(i,i9)=ii.8; P < .01), but not in 
the participants analysis (F < 1). This suggests that competitive incentives elicited 
more sensitivity to the addressee’s needs than co-operative ones.
15.3.2. Non-size modifiers
Non-size modifier rates were reliably affected by display type (Fi(2,86)=5.6, p< .01), 
game type (Fi(i,43)=5.5, P < .05), and the interaction of these factors (Fi(2,86)=4, 
P < .05). Non-size modifiers were reliably more common in the co-operative game. 
This suggests that they were used to convey helpful information about the hidden 
object. In addition, for co-operative speakers, there were significantly more non-size 
modifiers elicited by unique target than privileged contrast displays (Fi(i,32)=i9.i, 
P < .001; F2(i,i9)=65, P < .001) and a trend towards more in shared contrast compared 
to privileged contrast displays (Fi(i,32)=3.98, P < .05; F2(i,23)=i.4, P = .12). Thus more 
non-size modifiers were uttered in those conditions where it would have been the most 
helpful, but not in the privileged contrast displays where a size modifier could 
efficiently identify the privileged object on its own. For competitive speakers, there 
were no effects of display type (Fs < 2).
15.4. Discussion
Altogether, the evidence indicates that speakers systematically modulate their 
descriptions in accordance with the perspectives and needs of their interlocutors, 
as well as their own communicative goals. However, they do not do so perfectly. 
Co-operative speakers typically used size modifiers when describing a target to impli­
cate that the privileged object was a size contrast, and they used non-size modifiers to 
hint at the features of a non-contrastive privileged object. Conversely, competitive 
speakers rarely used size modifiers that would have leaked valuable information and 
did not modulate their non-size modifier usage for different types of privileged objects. 
However, none of these strategies was adopted in all relevant situations.
The co-operative results cannot be explained by positing that speakers are inher­
ently or frequendy egocentric (Keysar and Barr 2002). While under-informing in the 
privileged contrast condition is a failure to meet the addressee’s needs, it is not
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egocentric behaviour. From the speaker’s perspective, the target has a size contrast so 
distinguishing the target would demand a modifier. Furthermore, the co-operative 
results cannot be explained by the hypothesis that enhanced incentives made the 
privileged object more salient. This would have led to increased modifier use 
compared to the shared contrast condition, not less. Thus the claim that highlighting 
a privileged contrast leads to more modified target descriptions (Wardlow Lane et al. 
2006; Wardlow Lane and Ferreira 2008) cannot be applied here.
It is tempting to find a unified explanation for why both competitive and co­
operative speakers behaved non-optimally. There are at least two possibilities. First, 
speakers may have been focused on assisting with the addressee’s primary task of 
identifying the target, which could have detracted from their ability to manage the 
addressee’s secondary task of identifying the hidden object. This explanation cannot 
capture Wardlow Lane and Ferreira’s (2008) findings. They omitted the guessing 
task, but found more size modification for targets with privileged contrasts when the 
privileged object was the target on some filler trials. Thus, even when it interfered 
with the sole task of identifying the target, participants over-informed. A second 
possibility is that speakers have trouble using requests to implicate information to the 
addressee about the speaker’s privileged ground. Ordinarily, privileged ground infor­
mation is conveyed directly via assertion. Requests refer to information in the 
common ground. The unconventional means of conveying information may be 
challenging.
Two aspects of the findings above suggest that speakers may be more sensitive to 
addressees’ needs in competitive rather than co-operative settings. First, there was a 
trend toward more optimal behaviour in the competitive condition: It was easier for 
participants to omit a revealing size modifier in the competitive game than to 
helpfully include one in the co-operative game. Second, there was evidence that 
competitive speakers will over-inform in an attempt to implant a false belief about 
the identity of a hidden object. This indicates that reference production processes are 
exquisitely sensitive to the addressee’s communicative needs. This finding is also 
relevant to models of how speakers maintain shared information separate from 
privileged information in memory. For instance, Clark and colleagues have proposed 
that speakers use specialized memory structures called reference diaries to keep 
detailed records of what is shared with different addressees (Clark and Marshall 
1981; Clark and Murphy 1983). In principle, these diaries could support deception if 
they were extended to model hypothetical knowledge states. This would enable the 
speaker to represent the actual knowledge state and the intended counterfactual 
knowledge state in parallel. An alternative view is given by Horton and Gerrig 
(2005). They argue that general-purpose memory mechanisms are sufficient. In 
their model, the addressee, the referent, and the details of the communicative 
situation are represented as concepts in an associative network. When a referent is 
encountered in a given situation in the presence of an addressee, associative links are
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formed between the referent and addressee. A speaker can determine that a given 
referent is shared if the addressee concept is activated by the referent concept and 
vice versa. The network thus allows the speaker to perform a commonality assess­
ment for referents and addressees without explicitly modelling the knowledge of 
particular addressees. However, the associationist architecture enables this by having 
the same conceptual nodes simultaneously represent a referent and shared know­
ledge of that referent. As a result, it does not provide a natural means of separately 
representing actual and hypothetical knowledge states. Additional mechanisms 
would be necessary to explain deception.
The work summarized here investigates properties that can be encoded with 
prenominal modifiers. It is unclear whether the same degree of perspective sensitivity 
would arise with features that can only be conveyed with postnominal modifiers (e.g., 
the square with a light bulb, the book my uncle gave me). Postnominal modifiers 
exhibit similar referential properties to prenominal ones: They are used to distinguish 
amongst contrasting entities, and they implicate a contrast when they are used in a 
null discourse (Crain and Steedman 1985; Grodner etal. 2005). Thus the same 
communicative pressures apply to the production of both modifier types. On the 
other hand, postnominal modifiers usually contain more words and more compli­
cated syntactic constructions (e.g., relative clauses and prepositional phrases). This 
could increase the cognitive costs of producing these features. If so, then we would 
anticipate decreased modifier use under both incentive structures. This would result 
in competitive speakers being better at withholding privileged information and co­
operative speakers being worse at providing it. An important goal of future research 
is to explore a diverse range of feature types, incentive structures, and tasks in order 
to better understand how cognitive pressures and communicative goals are balanced 
in reference production.
